Revenue Ruling 78-248: The Congress and the Constitution be Damned by Alfred L. Scanlan, Shea & Gardner, Washington, D.C.
The Catholic Lawyer 
Volume 25 
Number 4 Volume 25, Autumn 1980, Number 4 Article 7 
September 2017 
Revenue Ruling 78-248: The Congress and the Constitution be 
Damned 
Alfred L. Scanlan, Shea & Gardner, Washington, D.C. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Alfred L. Scanlan, Shea & Gardner, Washington, D.C. (1980) "Revenue Ruling 78-248: The Congress and the 
Constitution be Damned," The Catholic Lawyer: Vol. 25 : No. 4 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol25/iss4/7 
This Diocesan Attorneys' Papers is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
REVENUE RULING 78-
248: THE CONGRESSAND THE
CONSTITUTION BE
DAMNED
ALFRED L. SCANLAN, ESQUIRE
NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE ARTICLE
In this paper, I discuss two recent rulings, especially Rev. Rul. 78-248
issued by the Internal Revenue Service on June 2, 1978, a ruling with
which, I am sure, many of you are most familiar. I discuss what I consider
to be the several severe illegalities, both statutory and constitutional,
which infect Rev. Rul. 78-248. Then I will examine the apparent reaction
to Rev. Rul. 78-248 in some Catholic circles, especially in some segments
of the Catholic press. Finally, and perhaps presumptuously, I offer a
prognosis or prediction of the future impact of the revenue ruling and
what I believe will be the fate which awaits it if it is ever at issue in court
proceedings.
SOME BACKGROUND
By way of background, let me say that although I am not a tax law-
yer as such, I have long been interested in the constitutional implications
of tax decisions and rulings. In addition, my partner, Louis M. Kauder,
who has assisted significantly in the preparation of this article, is an ex-
perienced tax lawyer. My familiarity with the precise revenue rulings dis-
cussed herein arises primarily from my position as General Counsel to the
National Committee For A Human Life Amendment, Inc. (NCHLA).
NCHLA is not a section 501(c)(3) organization; rather, it has qualified for
tax exemption as a "social welfare" organization under section 501(c)(4)
of the Internal Revenue Code. Thus, although it is not taxed on its own
income, contributions to NCHLA are not deductible. The organization, as
many of you may know, was formed to help educate the American people
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concerning the need for a human life amendment to the United States
Constitution and to secure their support of any effort, both in the Con-
gress and in the state legislatures, which will effect such a constitutional
change. NCHLA receives substantially all of its support from individual
dioceses of the Catholic Church in the United States. These contributors
are organizations exempt from tax under section 501(c)(3) of the Code.
Contributions to such organizations are deductible, but such an organiza-
tion retains its tax-exempt status only so long as "no substantial part" of
its activities involves legislative lobbying. Dioceses that contribute to
NCHLA have been advised, and I believe fully advised, that their contri-
butions to NCHLA must be considered as participation in legislative lob-
bying. Moreover, section 501(c)(3) organizations are absolutely barred, by
statutory definition, from participation in or intervention in political
campaigns. Such participation is expressly declared by statute to include
"the publishing or distributing of statements."'
At the outset, NCHLA was advised that its activities might be
treated as involvement in political campaigns and could be ascribed by
the IRS to the dioceses which provide financial support to NCHLA. Fur-
ther, the churches which might become involved directly in the activities
of local congressional district action committees (CDAC's) that have been
organized to carry out the lobbying work of NCHLA similarly might be
treated as having engaged in proscribed political activity. Thus, it is pos-
sible that political campaign activities of NCHLA could threaten the sec-
tion 501(c)(3) status of any diocese directly implicated in such activities.
It was for this reason, among others, that we have continued to counsel
NCHLA, in persistent and unambiguous terms, that CADC's should not
endorse, support or rate candidates for Congress in any way, no matter,
how subtly done.
RECENT IRS RULINGS
In Rev. Rul. 78-160 the Service held that an organization which ob-
tains and then disseminates by newsletter, without editorial comment,
the views of candidates for public office on topics of interest to the organ-
ization is not entitled to exemption under section 501(c)(3). The reason-
ing of the ruling was that dissemination of the views of candidates in
itself is an act that "can reasonably be expected to influence voters to
accept or reject candidates," and therefore that such dissemination con-
stitutes "participation and intervention in a political campaign" pro-
scribed by section 501(c)(3) for exempt organizations. The ruling was de-
clared applicable only on a prospective basis to any organization which
had revealed in its application for exemption that it would engage in the
I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3).
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activity described in the ruling. Issuance of Rev. Rul. 78-160 was greeted
by widespread consternation and severe criticism.2
Very quickly thereafter in Rev. Rul. 78-248, the Service hastened to
seek to clarify its position on the question considered in Rev. Rul. 78-160.
It revoked the earlier ruling and stated generally that some, but not all,
"voter education" activities are encompassed by the section 501(c)(3) pro-
hibition against participation in a political campaign. The second, more
recent ruling describes and rules on four situations. First, a compilation,
without editorial comment, of the voting records of all members of Con-
gress on a wide range of legislative issues is held not to be prohibited
political activity. Second, solicitation and dissemination to the public of
all candidates for governor in a single state, where the dissemination evi-
dences no bias or preference, is held not to be prohibited political activ-
ity. Third, solicitation and dissemination of the views of candidates for
public office is held to be prohibited political activity where the framing
of the questions to the candidates "evidences a bias on certain issues."
And last, publication of a voter's guide by an organization primarily con-
cerned with land conservation is held to be proscribed political activity
where the guide is intended as a compilation of incumbents' voting
records on selected land conservation issues of importance to the organi-
zation. In this situation, the Service reasons that emphasis on a single
area of concern indicates a purpose other than nonpartisan voter educa-
tion and therefore constitutes participation in political campaigns.
INVALIDITY OF THE REVENUE RULING
The Ruling Goes Beyond the Statute and the Regulations of the IRS
The initial, and perhaps the best, argument against the validity of
Rev. Rul. 78-248 is that it represents a distortion of congressional intent
in that it would deny or withdraw tax-exempt status to organizations
whose activities are not partisan under objective standards. Section
501(c)(3) provides:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for pub-
lic safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or interna-
tional amateur sports competitions (but only if no part of its activities in-
volve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention
of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which in-
nures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial
part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise at-
tempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsec-
2 See, e.g., Washington Post, June 2, 1978 at -, col. _; Catholic Standard, June 15, 1978, at
6, col. _.
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tion (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf
of any candidate for public office.3
The statutory provision quoted above, which was added to the Code
in 1934, prohibits a charitable organization from participating in a politi-
cal campaign on behalf of any candidate and also restricts any attempts
by such an organization to influence legislation except where such efforts
are an insubstantial part of the organization's activities. The legislative
history of the prohibition is skimpy and there have been fewer decided
cases and rulings concerning it than one might expect in view of its ambi-
guity and importance. I am aware of no cases in which partisan political
campaign activity by itself has been the cause of a loss of exempt status.
Where the IRS has sought to characterize legislative activities as substan-
tial and therefore in violation of the statute, the courts seem to agree only
on a finding that proscribed lobbying was a principal activity of the or-
ganization." The courts have stressed that the efforts of the organization
to enlighten the public on political issues is not proscribed activity so
long as the organization does not endorse or oppose political candidates.
In emphasizing that the section 501(c)(3) organizations in those decisions
did not endorse or oppose candidates for public office, the courts, in my
view, were at least impliedly indicating that they do not regard the publi-
cation of candidates' records on particular issues, without endorsement,
opposition or ratings, as proscribed political activity.
Thus, the argument that Rev. Rul. 78-248 goes beyond the statutory
prohibitions on political involvement seems sound. In Rev. Rul. 78-248,
the-IRS, without any showing that a single issue organization is involved
currently in political activity in behalf of or in opposition to any candi-
date for public office, nevertheless, presumes that, because of their very
nature, one-issue organizations are necessarily involved in proscribed po-
litical activity. Such a presumption, I believe, cannot stand up in light of
Seasongood' and related decisions.
Moreover, the ruling not only goes beyond the statute. It plainly
seems to depart from the relevant IRS regulations. For example, Reg.
1.501(c)-1(b)(3)(ii) provides in part that a section 501(c)(3) organization
is prohibited "directly or indirectly to participate in, or intervene in (in-
cluding the publishing or distributing of statements), any political cam-
paign on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office."
' I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3).
Compare Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973) with Dulles v. Johnson, 273 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1959) and
Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955) and Liberty Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 122 F. Supp. 759 (W.D. Ky. 1959).
Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955).
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(Emphasis added.) And Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3) provides that "[Ain or-
ganization may be educational even though it advocates a particular po-
sition or viewpoint so long as it presents a sufficiently full and fair expo-
sition of the pertinent facts as to permit an individual or the public to
form an independent opinion or conclusion." (Emphasis added.)
In addition, the fact "that an organization, in carrying out its pri-
mary purpose, advocates social or civic changes or presents opinions on
controversial issues with the intention of molding public opinion or creat-
ing public sentiment to an acceptance of its views does not preclude such
organization from qualifying under section 501(c)(3) .... "'
Revenue Ruling 78-248 to the contrary, the IRS regulations quoted
above would indicate that voter education groups which do not endorse or
oppose candidates for public office but which engage in nonpartisan re-
search and analysis of issues should be exempt as both educational and
charitable. In Rev. Rul. 78-248, however, the IRS apparently has deter-
mined that such groups are "action" groups, that is, organizations partici-
pating or intervening, directly or indirectly, in any political campaign on
behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office.7 The ruling
thus contradicts the IRS' published regulations and indeed also seems to
run against previous IRS rulings in which tax exemption was granted or-
ganizations which sponsored debates and forums on matters of political
concern despite the controversial nature of the speakers.'
The Constitutional Infirmities of the Ruling
I find it extraordinary that the IRS would conclude, as it apparently
has done in Rev. Rul. 78-248, that disseminating the views of candidates
for public office without in addition calling for the election or defeat of a
candidate could, in any objective context, constitute "partisan" political
activity proscribed by Congress for section 501(c)(3) organizations. The
activity which Rev. Rul. 78-248 held to be prohibited for section 501(c)(3)
organizations certainly does not fall within the common understanding of
"political campaigning," as expressed in the statute and in the IRS' own
regulations. If, however, I am incorrect in that opinion and IRS could
successfully claim a proper statutory basis for Rev. Rul. 78-248, then
grave constitutional implications immediately arise. I deal with these
now.
It is, of course, a cardinal principle of construction that statutes
should be construed to avoid constitutional invalidity if such a reading is
Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1980).
Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c)(3)-1(c)(iii) (1980).
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-574, 1974-2C.B. 160; Rev. Rul. 72-512, 1972-2C.B. 246.
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permissible in light of the language used.9 If section 501(c)(3) may cor-
rectly be construed to authorize the IRS to determine when speech that
does not expressly call for the election or defeat of a candidate is in fact
disqualifying political campaigning, the constitutionality of the statute is
surely in doubt.
The principle that courts will, if they reasonably can, avoid the deci-
sion of constitutional questions was demonstrated very recently in a close
factual context. I refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago.'0 In that case, the Court held that neither
the language of the National Labor Relations Act nor its legislative his-
tory disclosed "any affirmative intention by Congress" that church-oper-
ated schools are within the jurisdiction of the NLRB. A majority of five
justices, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Burger, noted that in "keep-
ing with the Court's prudential policy it is incumbent on us to determine
whether the Board's exercise of its jurisdiction here would give rise to
serious constitutional questions." In the event that such questions would
be presented, said the Court, "we must first identify 'the affirmative in-
tention of the Congress clearly expressed' before concluding that jurisdic-
tion existed." The Court, as stated, held that jurisdiction did not exist,
declining to construe the National Labor Relations Act "in a manner that
could in turn call upon the Court to resolve difficult and sensitive ques-
tions arising out of the guarantees of the First Amendment Religion
Clauses." I show below that very similar, and equally grave, difficulties
exist with Rev. Rul. 78-248.
There are at least three sound bases for holding that section
501(c)(3) as construed and implemented by Rev. Rul. 78-248 is constitu-
tionally infirm. Together they persuasively demonstrate, to my mind, the
incorrectness of the construction of section 501(c)(3) adopted by the Ser-
vice. -In the first place, there is probably insufficient correlation between
the legitimate government interests allegedly served by section 501(c)(3)
and the restrictions on expressive activity imposed by the ruling. Section
501(c)(3) reflects a congressional judgment that political partisanship
should not be subsidized through a tax exemption. 1 That judgment can
be effectuated by prohibiting section 501(c)(3) organizations from sup-
porting, opposing or rating candidates. By going further and proscribing
the dissemination of information when not accompanied by endorse-
ments, proposals or ratings, Rev. Rul. 78-248 does not advance substan-
1 See, e.g., Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 571
(1973); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1965); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1953); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41
(1952); United States v. Congress of Indus. Organizations, 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
1o 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
" Cf. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) (lobbying expenses nondeductible).
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tially the state's interest in preventing charitable organizations which en-
joy tax-exempt status from becoming involved in partisan politics. It
does, however, threaten a significant curtailment of voter education pro-
grams which help inform the electorate. In other words, the ruling may
well run afoul of the first amendment principle that restrictions on
speech, especially speech lying at the very core of the free speech protec-
tion of the Constitution, must be "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgement."' 2
In the second place, the distinction drawn by the ruling between dis-
semination of candidates' views on a variety of issues and dissemination
limited to a narrow range of issues renders the ruling constitutionally sus-
pect on another, independent, ground. Equal protection principles appli-
cable to the Federal Government by operation of the due process clause
of the fifth amendment require that distinctions among speech be care-
fully scrutinized and "tailored to serve a substantial governmental inter-
est."' 3 The ruling attempts to justify the distinction between single and
multi-issue voter guides by opining that a particular guide's "emphasis on
one area of concern indicates that its purpose is not nonpartisan voter
education." But the ruling's test for determining when voter education
activity is motivated by partisan purposes is both overinclusive and un-
derinclusive. Some organizations may seek to influence partisan elections
by disseminating information on a variety of issues. Other groups which
are primarily concerned with informing the electorate about a particular
set of issues may recognize that exercise of the franchise should be pre-
mised on assessment of the character and entire records of the candi-
dates. The practical result of the Service's ruling is that organizations
with the financial resources to include a wide range of issues in its mate-
rial may distribute voter guides without loss of tax-exempt status, but
organizations with the resources to address only a single issue may not.
Yet the "First Amendment's protection against governmental abridge-
ment of free expression cannot properly be made to depend on a person's
financial ability to engage in public discussion.""'
The third constitutional infirmity of Rev. Rul. 78-248 is its intimidat-
ing vagueness. The IRS now holds that when a 501(c)(3) organization dis-
seminates the views of all the candidates for an office it will lose its tax-
exempt status if its purpose was partisan, and that a brochure's emphasis
on a single area of interest may evidence such a purpose. This is an ex-
tremely unpredictable standard. An organization simply could not know
'2 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976); see First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1976); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
"8 Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972); see Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104 (1972).
" Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976).
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how the IRS would interpret its decision to disseminate the views of
candidates.
It is practically impossible to know whether, in particular circum-
stances, the mere publication of views of candidates or their voting
records on a particular issue constitutes a plea for the election of one
candidate and .the defeat of another. As is the case whenever free speech
is exercised, it is the hope of the actor that his speech will have some
effect on someone. But a stand on an issue does not constitute the call for
the election or defeat of a candidate. Such a call can be made only in
unmistakable language to that effect. I believe that unspoken and infer-
ential support of a candidate to some immeasurable degree is a standard
of legally insufficient specificity on which to ground administration of a
prohibition against political activity. Because it is not possible to know
how others might read one's choice to disseminate views of candidates, an
organization could never know beforehand whether it was engaging in
proscribed political activity.
The vagueness of Rev. Rul. 78-248 is objectionable for several reasons
grounded in the Constitution. It is, of course, an essential of due process
that fair warning be provided before penalties are imposed or privileges
revoked.' 5 Uncertain whether their voter education activities would lead
to revocation of tax-exempt status, many charitable organizations will
steer a safe course and forego exercise of their first amendment liberties.
As I discuss below, some Catholic publications have elected precisely such
a course of inaction. A final vice of the vagueness of Rev. Rul. 78-248 is
the unbridled discretion it affords IRS officials. Permitted to infer a par-
tisan purpose from the totality of the circumstances, officials charged
with administering Rev. Rul. 78-248 will be able to exercise their discre-
tion selectively to penalize unpopular organizations, including religious
groups, and ideas. 6 The selective discretion which the ruling would per-
mit could result in a situation, for example, where a future administration
that was anti-abortion and tolerant of the efforts by the Church to edu-
cate the electorate on issues related to abortion but, at the same time,
hostile to the efforts of other Church agencies to educate the electorate on
civil rights or economic issues. In this connection, I point out that the
United States Catholic Conference, a section 501(c)(3) organization, par-
ticipated in the circulation of the civil rights voting records of a number
of members of the Congress. Other section 501(c)(3) organizations also
participated in that effort. Under Rev. Rul. 78-248, the circulation of
these voting records could be regarded as a violation of the ruling and a
15 See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
507, 517-18 (1959).
6 See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 149 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958).
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cause for revocation of tax exemption. I note this particular incident not
to frighten anyone but only to illustrate the broad and dangerous dimen-
sions of the ruling.
In considering the validity of Rev. Rul. 78-248, I have not suggested
the invalidity of the statutory proscription against substantial legislative
lobbying and any political campaigning by section 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions. One commentator has argued the unconstitutionality of the lobby-
ing restriction without addressing the partisan political activity pro-
scription.' 7 Others have suggested constitutional arguments that do not
differentiate the lobbying restriction from the partisan campaign re-
striction.' 8
The arguments against both restrictions seem to me to be the same
insofar as they are grounded on first amendment and equal protection
considerations. The argument is essentially that enjoyment of a benefit
conferred by government, in this case tax exempt status, may not be con-
ditioned upon the abandonment of a constitutional right.' 9 Although I
consider the arguments against the validity of the present statutory pro-
hibition to be cogent, I do not believe them entirely persuasive even in
the more modern constitutional climate in which the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights, as made applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, have been afforded very extensive reach.20 Still, insofar as
Rev. Rul. 78-248 is concerned, one may concede the facial validity of the
statutory prohibitions but still readily demonstrate the invalidity of the
proscription against political activity as construed by the Revenue
Ruling.
FACTORS TO WEIGH IN ADVISING AFFECTED ORGANIZATIONS
Revenue Ruling 78-248 is an especially troublesome administrative
holding from the point of view of rendering advice to organizations possi-
bly affected by it. On the one hand, for the reasons previously stated, I
believe its validity to be very much in doubt. On the other hand, one may
not casually or cavalierly advise a client to ignore an interpretation of the
Code announced by the IRS. Yet, in the context of advice rendered by my
law firm, prior to publication of the ruling, that conservatively outlined
the duties and obligations of section 501(c)(3) and related (c)(4) entities
17 Troyer, Charities, Law-Making and the Constitution: The Validity of the Restrictions
on Influencing Legislation, 31 N.Y.U. TAX INST. 1415 (1973).
See Clark, The Limitation on Political Activities: A Discordant Note in the Law of
Charities, 46 VA. L. REV. 439 (1960); Note, Regulating the Political Activity of Founda-
tions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1843 (1970).
19 Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (veteran's property tax exemption cannot be
conditioned on the taking of a loyalty oath).
0 See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
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in sensitive political areas, we have in effect advised that that organiza-
tion continue as before without regard to the disturbing implications of
the revenue ruling.
That, however, is not how some others apparently have advised sec-
tion 501(c)(3) organizations and I think it important and useful to note
these differing approaches. Because the IRS has a well established, rea-
sonably efficient private rulings program, it is common for lawyers, faced
with an ambiguous tax regulation or ruling, to seek clarifying and defini-
tive guidance from the IRS, rather than counsel their clients to act, or not
act, on the basis of counsel's opinion of the matter. Yet, I strongly believe
that pursuit of clarification of Rev. Rul. 78-248 through the rulings pro-
cess is an extremely unwise course to follow in this early period in the life
of this controversial ruling.
I understand, I hope incorrectly, that legal representatives of the
Catholic press may seek specific rulings from the IRS on the full implica-
tions of Rev. Rul. 78-248. I know for a fact that the ACLU has sought a
clarifying ruling on behalf of a Protestant press organization. Yet, so far
as I can telr, the factual circumstances on which the IRS is likely to be
asked to rule in these situations seem clearly to fall on the negative side
of the ruling. Thus, requests for such rulings should be calculated to in-
vite IRS declarations that the proposed activities would cause revocation
of exemption. I am certain that a proliferation of private rulings to that
effect would greatly magnify the chilling influence the IRS already has
had on the reasonable and responsible voter education activities of the
religious press, especially since private rulings are now automatically
made public and circulated among tax professionals by the tax
publishers.
I believe that this cumulative chilling effect can and should be
avoided. There is reason to believe that Rev. Rul. 78-248 is not the end
result of actual examinations by the IRS of exempt organization activity,
but rather is the expression of IRS views on hypothesized facts, an ex-
pression motivated by an IRS need to respond to an election year clamor
that some organizations enjoying exempt status were exerting influence
on election results. While I have no desire to throw down gauntlets for
the IRS, I have doubted that the IRS would actually bring itself to revoke
exemptions of organizations that published material described in the neg-
ative examples in Rev. Rul. 78-248 on the grounds recited in the ruling
and for no other reason. I remain convinced that the IRS sought by issu-
ance of the ruling to accomplish its desired objective of neutralizing the
indirect political impact of exempt organization activities through the
chilling effect of an in terrorem announcement, but that it did not intend
to embark upon, and has not launched, an audit program actually
designed to implement the ruling on a uniform basis.
Those who invited IRS letter rulings in this difficult area, and in the
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meantime advised their clients to steer a wide berth around the troubles
portended by the ruling, would be acting as agent for the perpetuation of
the chilling effect on lawful activity, and at the same time would be push-
ing the IRS to more active examination and revocation activity than it
has exhibited a penchant for so far. Moreover, a negative letter ruling is
not itself a route to litigation in which Rev. Rul. 78-248 could be chal-
lenged. Even the new declaratory judgment procedures now authorized
under section 7828 of the Code are available only upon denial or revoca-
tion of exempt status; they are not likely to be available only upon issu-
ance of a prospective ruling that addresses proposed activity. The lawyer
who obtains a negative ruling has the same counseling problem which we
all have now, only he has exposed his client to a far greater likelihood of
revocation of exemption for past or continuing activity.
I am persuaded that the risks of possible confrontation with the IRS
are not so great that I must advise my clients to abandon activity argua-
bly within the reach of the ruling until, by an act of supplication, we
might achieve IRS blessing of the activity. If my clients are satisfied that
the activity is protected by the Constitution and the statute, they should
need no endorsement from the IRS. Fully cognizant of a difference of
opinion between the IRS and other lawyers, including myself, on the sub-
stantive issues, I adhere to the view that my clients are not realistically
exposed to a wrongful loss of exemption until the IRS exhibits an inclina-
tion to proceed to implement the ruling through audit examination, revo-
cation of exemption and resulting litigation.
I do not want to see the IRS pushed to a point where its political
obligations will require it to implement the ruling. A succession of ruling
letters on the subject, however, could have that effect and could cause the
IRS to solidify views that at this point may not be solidified. We must
bear in mind that we address noble and essential activity of free people,
and we should not be afraid that a mistaken bureaucratic view will pre-
vail over the free exercise of religion and speech protected by the Consti-
tution which so "plainly rank high in scale of our national values."'2 ' In-
deed, the Bishop of Chicago case, in my judgment, itself confirms the
opinion that the IRS, like the NLRB, ultimately will not be permitted to
step on the fundamental rights of free press and freedom of religion. If
continued activity of the sort arguably within the ambit of Rev. Rul. 78-
248 ultimately leads to litigation over exempt status, the litigation will
serve important social and political ends. I am unable to counsel my cli-
ents to avoid that litigation at all costs by abandoning protected activity
pending acceptance of my views by the IRS. I would hope that you and
your clients, the Catholic bishops of the United States, and the Catholic
21 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
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press, as well, would be willing to take as their gospel the Constitution of
the United States and not the Code as construed by the IRS in Rev. Rul.
78-248.
CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this paper I said I would give my judgment about
the future impact of Rev. Rul. 78-248, and also that I would predict what
the outcome might be if the ruling were ever to become an issue in litiga-
tion. Turning first to the less rash of these promises, I am convinced that
the ruling will not be implemented and actively enforced by the IRS
against churches and church-related organizations which mount the cour-
age to publicize the records of political candidates, whether on single is-
sues or on multiple issues, provided that such organizations do not par-
ticipate in political campaigns by endorsing, opposing or rating
candidates. On the other hand, if tax lawyers in any significant numbers
insist on rushing to the IRS to seek rulings on various fact situations, a
body of revenue rulings could build up quickly to the point that the IRS
bureaucracy might feel compelled to attempt to deny or revoke exemp-
tions of section 501(c)(3) organizations who proceed in a manner that IRS
believes to be in violation of the ruling.
Ultimately, should litigation ensue under section 7428 of the IRC
which challenged a denial or revocation of section 501(c)(3) exemption on
the basis of Rev. Rul. 78-248, I am reasonably confident that the ruling
would either be struck down by the courts or else its more jagged bureau-
cratic teeth would be pulled by judicial construction. Since, as I indicated
earlier, the argument that the ruling goes beyond the statute would make
unnecessary consideration of the several compelling constitutional argu-
ments against the ruling, it is on precisely that ground that I believe the
ruling would meet its judicial demise, or at least its substantial emascula-
tion. It could even be the case that a court might vitiate Rev. Rul. 78-248
on an even narrower, but still sound, ground, that is, the failure of the
ruling to comply with the IRS's own published regulations.2 Whatever
the ground of its overturning might ultimately prove to be, however, I, for
one, look forward to the day when the ruling receives the judicial fate it
so greatly deserves!
22 For an application of the traditional administrative law rule that an agency must comply
with its own rules see Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1975).
